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Ballot or bullet: Protecting the right
to vote in Nigeria
Basil Ugochukwu*
PhD Candidate and Legal Process Instructor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, Toronto, Canada

Summary
This article aims to construct a new paradigm for understanding the right
to vote in Nigeria. Following strong indications that the 2011 Nigerian
elections were managed better than in previous years, it is to be hoped
that future elections can be built on its relative success. Therefore,
as the country appears to have a handle on its electoral pathologies
(albeit relatively speaking), the article examines one way of providing
this assurance by placing the Nigerian voter at the centre and not the
margins of the electoral process. It analyses the right to vote and what it
means to the average Nigerian voter. Its starting position is that the right
to vote is nowhere explicitly enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution or its
electoral laws. Where, universally speaking, to vote is either a legal or
constitutional right, the article argues that in none of those conceptions
does such a right exist in Nigeria. Further, it shows how the Nigerian legal
and electoral systems inordinately prioritise the rights of political parties
and their candidates in elections over and above those of the ordinary
voter, an issue which it is contended has to be satisfactorily addressed to
meaningfully build upon the gains of the 2011 elections.

1

Introduction

As has been routine since Nigeria moved from military to civil rule in
1999, the country’s 2011 general elections received early evaluations
from various quarters. But the verdict this time was that the process
and its outcome departed substantially from what transpired in 2007
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and 2003. In relative terms, the votes of Nigerians in 2011 counted
perhaps more than ever since the transition from military to civil rule.
Several authorities confirm and justify this conclusion. Both arms of
the national parliament have a politically more diverse membership,
unlike previously when the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP)
seemed to literally sweep the opposition off the political horizon by
fair or, more often, crooked means.2 Many states are now controlled
by political parties other than the PDP. Quite significantly, the most
important verdict on the election came from Nigerians themselves
who, notwithstanding the unfortunate post-election violence in some
states in the northern parts of the country, agreed that the elections
to a great extent represented their will as voters.3
Nigerians have (and justifiably so) been asking questions about how
it was possible to so significantly improve the credibility of the electoral
process within a four-year span when the country in 2007 conducted
perhaps its worst elections in history. What individuals or institutions
should share the credit for this? Is what happened in the 2011 elections
sustainable over time or is it a once-off event that would last only until
retrograde politicians (so obviously tripped or surprised by it) regroup
in the coming years and reverse the gains made? What should be done
to ensure such a reversal, if attempted, is not achieved? If the lessons
of history are anything to go by, is it not possible that the country will
sleep on this relative success?
With the shortcomings of elections since the 1999 transition as
helpful background, it is possible to contextualise the relative successes
of the 2011 Nigerian elections and to place in perspective the factors
that may have enabled that outcome. Without a doubt, two factors
1

2

3

See O Adeniyi ‘Divided opposition as boon to African incumbents’ http://www.
wcfia.harvard.edu/ fellows/papers/2010-11/Paper_Adeniyi_final.pdf (accessed
10 May 2012); ‘Nigeria’s elections, despite alleged vote buying, was most credible
since 1999’ Touch Base http://www.touchbaseonline. ca/?p=1716 (accessed
10 May 2012), stating that ‘[c]ivil society watchdog groups, including the Abujabased coalition known as the Elections Situation Room, say electoral reforms
initiated under the leadership of elections commission chief Attahiru Jega have
enabled greater transparency in the 2011 polls. International observer groups also
said the polls were the most credible since 1999.’
The fraud-ridden elections of 2003 and 2007 coincided with PDP’s near total
dominance of the two arms of the National Assembly. In 1999 the party returned
59 members of a 109-seat senate and 206 members of a 360-seat house of
representatives. In 2003 they returned 76 senators and 223 house members, while
in 2007 the party had 87 senators and 263 house members. By 2011 its share fell
to 71 senators and 202 house members. Ten parties are represented in the 2011
National Assembly, unlike previously when only a handful of the parties returned
members. See, generally, P Lewis’s Nigeria Country Report (Cape Town: Centre for
Social Science Research, 2011) http://www. africanlegislaturesproject.org/sites/
africanlegislaturesproject.org/files/ALP%20Nigeria%20Country%20Report_0.pdf
(accessed 11 May 2012).
See eg H Ibrahim ‘2011 polls: NGOs give INEC pass mark’ Saturday Tribune http://
www.tribune.com.ng/sat/index.php/news/4080-2011-polls-ngos-give-inec-passmark.html (accessed 11 May 2012).
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played a substantial role in this regard. The first is a welcome change
in the direction of electoral management. Under a new leadership,
Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), which
before now had been anything but independent, embraced a different
conception of its role as an electoral umpire. The institution did not
feel as beholden to the ruling party in the 2011 elections as had
been the case previously. In the process, it did retrieve some of its
lost credibility and legitimacy as a democratic public institution and
introduced a new electoral management template upon which future
progress may be established. Secondly, the incumbent President did
not feel as entitled as the incumbent in 2003 and 2007 to press home
the advantages of his position, especially in all non-presidential polls.
He was rather willing to not manipulate INEC or the security forces (as
had happened in past elections) to subvert popular will.4
Yet, this by no means is any indication that the 2011 elections were
free of all negative incidents. Allegations that the election – especially
the presidential ballot – was rigged, stood in contrast to the very
positive evaluations stated above. In the northern parts of the country
these complaints soon gave way to violent riots, leading to several
deaths and the destruction of public and private property.5 However,
in addition to what the rioters may have perceived as the manipulation
of the election, the subsequent violence was in part also blamed
on ‘inflammatory statements made by political leaders and public
discourse in the media before, during and after the elections’.6 The
complaints of rigging and violent riots that ensued, though detracting
from the major positives from the election, did only little to place it in
the same situation as all other elections in the country since the 1999
transition.
However, although better election management and restraint in using
incumbency powers may to consolidate Nigeria’s electoral democracy
in the short term, they still fall far below the requirements for ensuring
the maintenance of that culture in the long term. They place undue
emphasis on individual character and action in contrast to procedural
effectiveness and institutional durability as objective qualities of
a stronger electoral system. The question here is: What happens in
4

5

6

See ‘Sahara reporters interview prominent Nigerian activist Innocent Chukwuma’
http://sahararepor ters.com/video/sahara-repor ters-inter views-prominentnigerian-activist-innocent-chukwuma (accessed 11 May 2012). Chukwuma, a
former Chairperson of the Transition Monitoring Group, TMG, Co-ordinating
Committee, stated that the INEC was ‘arguably neutral’ and that the incumbent
President did not show an inclination to be particularly ‘overbearing’.
See ‘Nigeria election: Riots over Goodluck Jonathan win’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-africa-13107867 (accessed 8 September 2012). See also Human
Rights Watch ‘Nigeria: Post-election violence killed 800’ http://www.hrw.org/
news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800 (accessed 8 September
2012).
PE Ofili ‘Provocative discourse and violence in Nigeria’s 2011 elections’ (2011) 17
The Africa Portal Backgrounder 1.
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future, assuming that the INEC reverts to a leadership less concerned
about organising credible elections than with its relationship to the
ruling party or if an incumbent president emerges who would rather
exhaust all advantages conferred by that incumbency position than
worry about whether elections are fair? It is because of the fragility
and subjectivity of an overt reliance on individual character that a
different paradigm built on the strength and objectivity of institutions
and procedures is desirable to sustain free elections and democracy
in Nigeria.
In this article, I will approach the goal of constructing this new
paradigm by placing the Nigerian voter in her rightful place in the
electoral architecture. It may well be that the 2011 elections were a
once-off anomaly unless strong assurances exist that future elections
can be built on its relative successes. I therefore intend to analyse the
right to vote and what that right means to the average Nigerian voter.
Where, universally speaking, to vote is either a legal or constitutional
right, I argue in this article that no such right exists in Nigeria. Further,
I will show how the Nigerian legal and electoral systems inordinately
prioritise the rights of political parties and their candidates in elections
over and above those of the ordinary voter, an issue which I contend
has to be addressed satisfactorily to meaningfully build upon the gains
of the 2011 elections.
My starting position is that the right to vote is nowhere explicitly
enshrined in the Constitution or the electoral laws. In the first
instance, Nigerians tend to conflate the right to vote with the right
to be registered as a voter. Besides, voters do not have any legal
rights under the electoral law to challenge the outcome of elections.
Thus, to the average Nigerian, to vote means no more than merely
casting a ballot and exiting the polling station. If anything happens
to the vote (for example if it is diluted, debased, made not to count or
otherwise rendered ineffective), the Nigerian voter, whether legally or
constitutionally, is left with absolutely no remedy. Therefore, even if
assuming that the right to vote exists in Nigeria, it defies the popular
ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy) doctrine.
I proceed by analysing the presence or lack of legal protection of the
right to vote in Nigeria. I refer to comparative practices from other
jurisdictions in Africa and elsewhere to show how they compare to
Nigeria’s current regime, identifying shortcomings and making
recommendations for a new regime that places the rights of voters
where they truly belong. Most of these comparisons are drawn
from Africa as they share political and social situations with Nigeria.
In addition, these countries have written constitutions with a broad
array of human rights guarantees, as is the case in Nigeria. Where I
highlight the practices of jurisdictions outside Africa, it is to provide
added analytical insight.
For purposes of clarity, it should be stated that my main concern
is whether there is a right to vote in Nigeria qua constitutional right
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that an ordinary voter could enforce like all other constitutional rights.
It is likely that the right could be derived from other rights, such as
the right to equality and freedom from discrimination. The Nigerian
courts have sometimes in the past allowed such derivative protection
of rights, for example, when it was decided that the right to a travel
passport arises from the right to freedom of movement.7 While it
may be possible to derive the right to vote from other rights, it has
not already happened. In the circumstances, my analysis is restricted
to what the right to vote means presently in Nigeria and not so much
what it might become in future.
In the next section of the article I provide a conceptual outline of the
right to vote, while section 3 contains an analysis of whether the right
to vote is a right or a mere privilege. In section 4 I turn my attention
to the tendency in Nigeria to confuse the right to vote with the right
to be registered as a voter. The fifth section examines the nature of
the legal protection accorded the right to vote in Nigeria, again from
a comparative perspective. In section 6 I provide justification for
the contention that the right to vote in Nigeria has to be protected
if democracy is to be consolidated. The last section contains some
concluding reflections.

2

Conceptualising the right to vote

Though legal and political scholars alike disagree on the true meaning
and ramifications of democracy as a form of government,8 they are
united at least on one of its core foundations: elections as a means
of making popular voices heard and of putting practical effect to the
description of that political form as government of the people, by
the people and for the people.9 In a sense, therefore, elections are

7

8

9

See Olisa Agbakoba v Director, State Security Service (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt 351) 475
(NCA). See also OC Okafor ‘The fundamental right to a passport under Nigerian
law: An integrated viewpoint’ (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 53.
P Schmitter & TL Karl ‘What democracy is … and is not’ (1991) 2 Journal of
Democracy 75: ‘For some time, the word democracy has been circulating as a
debased currency in the political market place. Politicians with a wide range of
convictions and practices strove to appropriate the label and attach to it their
actions. Scholars, conversely, hesitated to use it – without adding qualifying
adjectives – because of the ambiguity that surrounds it.’ See also S Lindberg
Democracy and elections in Africa (2006); M Halperin ‘Guaranteeing democracy’
(1993) 91 Foreign Policy 106.
Taken from an address by former United States President Abraham Lincoln
delivered at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on 19 November 1863, http://history1800s.
about.com/od/abrahamlincoln/a/ gettysburgtext.htm (accessed 11 May 2012): ‘It
is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us – that
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they
gave the last full measure of devotion – that we here highly resolve that these dead
shall not have died in vain – that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of
freedom – and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall
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the oxygen that democracy breaths. Without elections or some other
process by which it is possible for the people to effect the orderly
renewal of the mandate or a peaceful replacement of political officials,
democracy is empty. In fact, to speak of democracy without elections
is a contradiction.
Once it is agreed that elections form the bedrock of democratic
governance, we need also to agree on the value of the vote as an
election marker. Universal suffrage is usually considered one of the
most basic criteria for an election to be deemed democratic.10 Among
the seven conditions identified by Dahl as necessary for the existence
of a polyarchy is the one that ‘practically all adults have the right to
vote’.11 Yet, according to Gardner voting has no intrinsic value because
even autocratic states hold elections in which the only candidate on the
ballot is the incumbent autocrat. The results of this ‘election’ are then
used to defend the political legitimacy of the autocratic regime.12
However, voters, and the political systems to which they belong,
know how important it is that their votes are worth more than this.
It is noted, for example, that an extensive body of voting rights law is
devoted to the proposition that the denial of the vote – or the denial
of an ‘effective’ vote – is presumptively bad. The question is: Why?
‘What exactly is so important about the right to vote that its denial, or
the perception of its denial, is so offensive?’13 It is possible, therefore,
that persons who claim its denial are actually claiming the following:
They could be claiming that their exclusion from the franchise leaves
them with an inadequate ability to influence the outcome of the
governmental decision-making processes. They could also very well
be saying that a denial of the vote constitutes an unacceptable form
of exclusion from a validating social practice. In other words, they are
claiming that exclusion from voting is, ‘in effect, marks of inferiority,
a consignment to a degrading form of second-class citizenship’.14 In
recognition of the above, the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Wesberry v Sanders15 held that ‘[n]o right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make
the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights,
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.’

not perish from the earth.’
A Blais et al ‘Deciding who has the right to vote: A comparative analysis of election
laws’ (2001) 20 Electoral Studies 41.
11 R Dahl Democracy and its critics (1989) 233.
12 JA Gardner ‘Liberty, community and the constitutional structure of political
influence: A reconsideration of the right to vote’ (1997) 145 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 893 900. See also F Zakaria ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’ (1997) 76
Foreign Affairs 22.
13 As above.
14 As above.
15 (1964) 376 US 1 17.
10
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Because of the importance of the right to vote in a democracy,
societies which practise that form of government have devised various
means of protecting it. Yet, while it is customary for all such countries
to claim the existence of the right to vote, contextual variations exist
across jurisdictions. Significantly, therefore, the right to vote does not
have the same meaning or have the same degree of legal protection
in all democracies; the mechanisms for securing and protecting it
differ from country to country. Often the right to vote is shorn of its
‘entitling’ characteristics in which case it may be more appropriate to
speak of it as being a privilege rather than a right. I will return to this
point later. To illustrate the point about distinctive country preferences
in the protection of the ballot, it is important as well to consider how
the right to vote has evolved and the theories that have been applied
to every level of its historical evolution.
Kirby identifies five stages in the historical evolution of the right to
vote.16 Among primitive peoples, in the city states of antiquity and
during the Renaissance, the citizenship theory of the voting right
prevailed. Under this theory, the right to vote was an attribute of
citizenship. This theory holds true to this day, going by the practices
of many countries which make the right to vote contingent upon
citizenship. The second was the vested privilege theory in which the
right to vote was distributed by reference to pure feudal principles. It
was in this conception a vested privilege, an incident of a particular
status and usually connected to land or other property ownership.17
The third theory Kirby identifies is the natural rights theory in which
the right to vote, like all other such rights, are abstract and founded
on the basis of natural law, a consequence of a social compact and an
incident of popular sovereignty.18
Under the government function theory of the right to vote, which is
derived from modern principles of political science, Kirby states that
in casting the ballot, a voter is performing a public function much
like a legislator or judge. That therefore makes the voter an organ of
government. The ethical theory, which is the last that Kirby identifies,
suggests that the right to vote is essential to the development of the
individual character, a condition necessary for the realisation of the
full worth of the human personality.19
In historical terms, the development of voting rights in Nigeria
followed a somewhat similar trajectory to Kirby’s outline above
from the period when efforts were concentrated on restricting or
depressing the voting field and up to the time when those restrictions

J Kirby ‘The constitutional right to vote’ (1970) 45 New York University Law Review
996.
17 As above.
18 As above.
19 As above.

16
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were lifted and the pool of voters increased. According to Ayaode,20
the development of voting rights in Nigeria could be divided into three
historical periods: 1922-1950, 1950-1958 and 1958-1966. Significantly,
each of these periods engaged, in terms of the right to vote, a distinct
theoretical framework, as we will see presently. The first period, 19221950, according to Ayoade, was the period in which the right to vote
was a vested privilege as with Kirby’s ‘vested privilege theory’ above.
At that time, Ayoade informs us, the voting franchise was restricted
both spatially and numerically. It was available in only two cities:
Lagos and Calabar, which were both prosperous and commercially
cosmopolitan. These cities also had the most educated inhabitants in
the country at the time.
During this period regulations attached to the franchise limited
the number of people qualified to vote. This privilege was given only
to male citizens aged 21 and above. In addition to citizenship and
residency requirements, the prospective voter also had to possess an
annual income of not less than 100 pounds during the calendar year
immediately preceding the year of the election. Ayoade concludes
that for this period, these restrictions and a further one which placed
the onus of registration on the prospective voter rather than the state
appreciably cut down the number of voters.
Unlike the first period of mixed regulations, the second era of 19501958 saw the promulgation of ones universally applicable throughout
the country. This apparent universality notwithstanding, the federal
electoral regulations still took cognisance of regional diversities.21
This framework was consolidated in the third era, 1958-1966, when
a marked improvement in federal competence in the regulation of
federal elections was established. For example, the Elections (House
of Representatives) Regulations of 1958 stipulated that its provisions
shall apply throughout the entire country.22 However, in some areas,
regional peculiarities still prevailed. It is therefore significant for our
purposes that, while the above regulations endorsed universal adult
suffrage in both the eastern and western regions, it approved only
male suffrage in the northern region. These two periods seemed to
recognise the right to vote in the east and west on the basis of the ethical
and natural rights theories that Kirby discussed while maintaining its
feudal characteristics in the north. The entire country later adopted
universal suffrage in the years following independence in 1960.

J Ayoade ‘Electoral laws and national unity in Nigeria’ (1980) 23 African Studies
Review 42.
21 As above.
22 As above.

20
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Is the vote a right or privilege?

I stated earlier that there are variations across legal and political
jurisdictions on the true nature of the franchise. While some view it ‘as
a mere civil right dependent on law’, others see it as a ‘fundamental
political right’.23 Unlike the position of the United States Supreme
Court in the earlier referenced case of Wesberry v Sanders, in the case of
Re North Perth; Hessein v Lloyd,24 it was stated that ‘the franchise is not
an ordinary civil right, it is historically and truly a statutory privilege
of a political nature being the chief means whereby the people,
organised for political purposes, have their share in the function of
government’.
Even if imagined as a right, Lardy still believes that the vote is different
from all other rights because it is ‘based upon a different theory of
liberty from that which founds the traditional civil liberties’.25 That
writer goes on to argue that traditional civil liberties ‘are essentially
about guaranteeing liberty in the sense of non-interference by
officialdom with individual choice and action’.26 Further:27
This theory of negative liberty forms, however, only a tangential part of the
idea of the right to vote, and is always subsidiary to its essential concern
with establishing and maintaining the democratic authority of voters.
This authority constitutes a permission to participate in elections. It does
more, though, than merely license voters to cast ballots if they so choose,
as proponents of the right to vote effectively suggest. The democratic
standing which the right to vote confers is fully intelligible only as the
award of an entitlement to participate actively, rather than as a merely
passive possessor of the franchise.

In addition to the above, there are other characteristics that
differentiate the right to vote from other libertarian rights and for
which reason some have questioned the tendency to sometimes
describe it ‘as a civil liberty, or even as a human right’.28 Thus, the
central function of the right to vote is to guarantee the entitlement
of all qualified individuals to cast a vote as opposed to all other rights
which are generally distributed to individuals without reference to
their abilities or qualifications to perform the activity protected by the
right.29 In addition, those other rights are universal and are enjoyed
by all within the jurisdiction which has authority to enforce them. On

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

E Azinge ‘The right to vote in Nigeria: A critical commentary on the open ballot
system’ (1994) 38 Journal of African Law 173.
Cited by Azinge (n 23 above).
H Lardy ‘Is there a right not to vote?’ (2004) 24 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
311.
As above.
As above.
As above.
As above.
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the contrary, the right to vote, even though often described in terms
of universal suffrage, is not by any means universal as typically only
citizens qualify to vote while other requirements (residence, capacity
and good behaviour) often come into play.30
The above view perhaps provides a foundation for the opinion that to
vote ‘might be a mere political right, privilege or civil right to be given
or withheld at the exercise of the law-making powers of the sovereign’
and that ‘in the absence of an express constitutional grant, [it] is not a
vested, absolute or natural right of which a citizen cannot be deprived
and it is not vested absolutely in any citizen’.31 According to Kirshner,
there are four different categories of constitutions in terms of how
they treat the right to vote.32 Firstly, there are those in which there is
no affirmative constitutional right to vote and there is no legislation
of similar weight. Among countries he placed in this category are
Australia, the Bahamas, Bagladesh, Barbados, Belize, India, Indonesia,
Nauru, Samoa, the United States and the United Kingdom.33
Secondly, there are constitutions that establish universal suffrage
for the election of sovereign bodies – such as parliament. Kirshner
places Nigeria in this category, which also includes countries such
as Germany, Jamaica, Russia, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, South
Korea, and others.34 Since this chapter is on Nigeria, I will later show
how this categorisation is erroneous, being that it conflates the right
to be registered as a voter with the right to vote. Thirdly, there are
constitutions that provide a general and independent right to vote
and, fourthly and finally, there are constitutions that not only provide
for a right to vote, but also specify a government obligation to facilitate
citizen participation and those that limit the kinds of restrictions the
state can place on who is eligible to vote.35
Regarding the language in which the right to vote could be
constitutionally textualised, drawing from contemporary comparative
constitutional provisions governing the subject, there are two major
ways this could be accomplished. Any one of the above four categories
of constitutions can express the text of the voting right in any of
these two ways. On the one hand, there are constitutions broadly
establishing the right of citizens to vote for constitutionally-defined

30
31
32
33

34

35

As above. See also Blais et al (n 10 above) 43-58.
Azinge (n 23 above) 174.
A Kirshner ‘The international status of the right to vote’ http://www.demcoalition.
org/pdf/ International_Status_of_the_Right_to_Vote.pdf (accessed 11 May 2012).
As above. For an analysis of the dilemma in India, see R Kadambi ‘Right to vote as a
fundamental right: Mistaking the woods for trees. PUCL v Union of India’ (2009) 3
Indian Journal of Constitutional Law 181.
As above. Taking the South Korean Constitution as sample, it provides in art 41
that ‘[t]he National Assembly is composed of members elected by universal, equal,
direct, and secret ballot by the citizens’, while art 67 thereof provides that ‘[t]he
President is elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot by the people’.
Kirshner (n 32 above) 8.
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electoral positions, and on the other hand there are constitutions
which not only guarantee universal suffrage, but also stipulate that this
fundamental right exists at every level of government. Constitutions in
the second category could also curb the ability of the government to
reduce the size of the electorate.36 It is, however, by evaluating the next
quality of the voting right that one could tell whether indeed it is an
enforceable right or a mere privilege. Kirshner says that constitutional
right to vote articles provide individuals with a powerful tool with
which to challenge a state action or state inaction that impedes voters.
He recognises, though, that the right to vote is not a prescription that
cures all.37
The aforegoing offers an excellent background for my analysis of
the nature of the right to vote in Nigeria. It has been claimed that the
right to vote in Nigeria is conferred by the Constitution and therefore
constitutional.38 In support of this assertion, sections 65, 77, 106, 117,
131 and 132(1), (4) and (5) of the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 have
been mentioned.39 As I stated earlier, I will contest these claims on
two grounds. In the next section, I canvass those grounds in greater
detail.

4

Nigeria: Between the right to register as a voter
and the right to vote

I will now expand my contention that those who describe the right to
vote in Nigeria as one guaranteed under the Constitution are making a
mistake by not distinguishing the right to register to vote in an election
from the right to vote itself. To support this view, I will examine more
closely the constitutional provisions they rely upon to advance that
error. In this section as well, an analysis of how the Nigerian provision
compares to other constitutions will be undertaken.
The first provision usually mentioned is section 65 of the Constitution,
which is clearly off the mark because it deals only with qualification
for election as a member of the Nigerian National Assembly. The
next is section 77 which is also not helpful. This provision deals
with the process of electing senators and members of the house of
representatives as well as those who could qualify to be registered as

As above.
As above.
38 Azinge (n 23 above) 174.
39 A Omakoji ‘The role of the courts in the enforcement of electoral rights through
election complaints: A comparative study of Nigeria and the United Kingdom’
LLM dissertation, Central European University, 2009 http://goya.ceu.hu/search
(accessed 10 May 2012).
36
37
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voters for legislative houses elections. For clarity, let me reproduce the
entire provision:40
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every senatorial district
or federal constituency established in accordance with the provisions
of this part of this Chapter shall return one member who shall be
directly elected to the Senate or the House of Representatives in such
a manner as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.
(2) Every citizen of Nigeria, who has attained the age of eighteen years
residing in Nigeria at the time of the registration of voters for purposes
of election to a legislative house, shall be entitled to be registered as a
voter for that election.

Section 106 of the Constitution, usually highlighted by some as one of
those provisions from which a right to vote could be constitutionally
supported in Nigeria, is in similar terms as section 65 above, and section
117 is worded exactly as section 77. The only difference, however, is
that, while sections 65 and 77 relate to elections into the National
Assembly, sections 106 and 117 only deal with elections to the State
Houses of Assembly. The similarities in the text of these provisions
would therefore provide a sufficient indication that, as with sections
65 and 77, sections 106 and 117 do not help an understanding of the
constitutional nature of the right to vote in Nigeria.
In the same manner, sections 131 and 132 of the Constitution,
touted as providing a constitutional foundation for the right to vote
in Nigeria, do not remotely come close to doing so. While section
131 deals with qualification for election into the office of President,
section 132 is only significant for the manner in which subsection (5) is
created. It provides there that ‘[e]very person who is registered to vote
at an election of a member of a legislative house shall be entitled to
vote at an election to the office of President’. Sections 177 and 178(5)
make similar provisions with respect to who can qualify to stand for
election as a state governor and who would be qualified to vote at
such an election. Although these provisions contain the words ‘shall
be entitled to vote’, they cannot be taken out of the context in which
those words occurred. When they are taken together with all the other
provisions already examined, one cannot escape the conclusion that
they were not intended to express a constitutional or enforceable right
to vote. To support this contention, I shall now look at a few examples
of how the right to vote has been textualised in some comparative
constitutions.
How do the Nigerian provisions compare to those of other African
countries? Part 2 of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 contains what
it describes as ‘rights and fundamental freedoms’, among which
are political rights, including the right of every adult citizen without
unreasonable restrictions (a) to be registered as a voter; and (b) to vote

40

My emphasis.
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by secret ballot in any election or referendum. Equally significant is
the constitutional provision that none of the guaranteed rights and
fundamental freedoms shall be limited ‘except by law, and then only
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom’.42 In the Kenyan context, therefore, the right to vote is easily
enforceable when it is infringed.
The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution contains similar provisions. Its third
chapter, like its Kenyan equivalent, enshrines fundamental rights and
freedoms. While the first part of the chapter deals with ‘human rights’,
the second part deals with ‘democratic rights’. Included among
democratic rights in article 38 is the right to vote and to be elected.
Section 38(1) provides:
Every Ethiopian national, without discrimination based on colour, race,
nation, nationality, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion or
other status, has the following rights:
(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly and through
freely chosen representatives;
(b) on the attainment of 18 years of age, to vote in accordance with law;
(c) to vote and to be elected at periodic elections to any office at any level
of government; elections shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of electors.

Again, as is the case in Kenya, Ethiopian voting rights are not
unenforceable. This view is supported by the fact that article 13(1) of
the Constitution charges all federal and state legislative, executive and
judicial organs at all levels with the responsibility and duty to respect
and enforce the provisions of the human rights chapter. It goes further
to provide in article 13(2) that ‘[t]he fundamental rights and freedoms
specified in this chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming
to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
international instruments adopted by Ethiopia’.
When comparing these constitutional provisions to those of Nigeria,
one cannot avoid the conclusion that the right to vote does not seem
to exist as such under the Constitution of Nigeria. The Constitutions
of Kenya, Ethiopia and, as I will show later, Ghana, do not tie the right
to vote to one’s registration as a voter. In all these Constitutions the
right is accorded the same force and recognition as other fundamental
human rights. The conclusion that could be drawn from this, therefore,
is that where a voter believes that the right has been tampered with,
a consequential right to seek a judicial remedy is triggered. In the
next section, I will discuss how judicial redress for the infringement of
the right to vote adds to its significance as a right rather than a mere
privilege.

41
42

Sec 38(3).
Sec 24(1).
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What legal protection exists for the right to vote?

The major reason I advance for my contention that the right to vote
does not exist as such in Nigeria is the lack of any legal remedies
available for voters if the right is breached or impeded. Yet, if indeed
it is a constitutional right as claimed in some quarters, it means a
correlative duty is imposed on institutions for its actualisation, failing
which an entitlement to a remedy is triggered. For example, had the
right to vote been included as one of the fundamental rights recognised
under the Constitution,43 it would have been obvious that, like all the
other rights in this category, its denial could be remedied by a legal
application to that effect. However, this is not the case. However, even
more significantly, ordinary voters are not included in the category of
persons who may question or complain about election results in an
election tribunal established to handle such complaints.
The prevailing system in Nigeria is that after each election cycle,
special tribunals are established to look into grievances and complaints
arising from elections.44 For unknown reasons, this practice was started
in the country during the elections that heralded the transfer of power
from the military to civilians in 1992. But the establishment of special
election tribunals to deal with electoral complaints (in exception to
the regular courts) has taken root and become a prominent feature of
Nigeria’s electoral practice. These tribunals are established under the
Constitution,45 but the procedure they adopt for their activities are
prescribed in the Electoral Act.46
Not every person aggrieved by a result declared after an election
in Nigeria is competent to launch a complaint before such a tribunal.
Nigerian voters do not have such competence and are therefore barred
from presenting any complaints if aggrieved by the results declared
after an election. According to section 137(1) of the Electoral Act 2010
(as amended), ‘[a]n election petition may be presented by one or more
of the following persons: (a) a candidate in an election; (b) a political
party which participated in the election’. One therefore wonders about
the effect of the so-called right to vote in Nigeria if voters are unable to
exercise the legal right to question a denigration of that right. Again,
this is a travesty when no particular remedy flows from the exercise of
the right to vote if the vote is diluted or discounted.
However, treating the rights of Nigerians to exercise the franchise
with derision has its roots in Nigeria’s political and legal culture.
With the constitutional shackles in place, as discussed earlier, there is
restraint in the legal process as a mechanism for enforcing the right
Secs 33-46 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.
See eg B Ugochukwu Democracy by court order: An analytical evaluation of the
2007 election petition tribunals in Nigeria (2009).
45 See sec 285 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended.
46 See sec 145 of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended.
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to vote in Nigeria. One of the first cases related to this was decided
a year after Nigeria’s independence in 1960. In Ojiegbe v Ubani47
the applicants claimed that, by fixing and holding elections on a
Saturday, the government denied their franchise as well as violated
their right to be free from discrimination. The applicants all belonged
to the Seventh Day Adventists Christian denomination whose ethics,
according to them, did not allow them to vote on a Saturday, which is
their appointed day of worship.48
Two things are significant in the way in which the Nigerian Federal
Supreme Court resolved the case. In the first instance, the denial of
the franchise was subsidiary and marginal to the overarching claims
of the applicants. Secondly, that portion of their application was not
presented as a human rights enforcement claim as were the allegations
of discrimination and violation of their freedom of conscience and
religion. Nevertheless, it was on the basis of the denial of the franchise
component of the claim that the Court disposed of it. In doing this,
however, the Court demonstrated clearly how trivial it considered the
claim. In its judgment, the Court came to the conclusion that, assuming
all the members of the Seventh Day Adventist Church who alleged a
denial of their franchise had voted in that election, the individual who
was declared a winner would still have emerged victorious.
However, in my view, the Court made a serious error. The question
before it was whether the complainants had been denied their right
to vote. It was not whether or not their votes would have affected the
electoral outcome. Clearly, the validity and potency of this right is not
dependent on whether or not exercising it would affect the result of
an election. This decision therefore detracted significantly from the
right in question. I doubt that this was what the legislation intended.
This hurdle was erected for Nigerian voters immediately following
independence, but since has been raised even higher with the provisions
of the Electoral Act that I referenced above. The consequences of
the current dispensation for voters who have complaints about the
outcome of elections in which they participated were highlighted in
the case of Chuba Egolum v Olusegun Obasanjo and Others.49 This
case arose from the presidential elections held in Nigeria in 1999.
Egolum, a registered voter, was aggrieved by the announcement that
Obasanjo was the winner of the election and decided to challenge
it in court. As with the 2010 Electoral Act, the legal framework for
that election provided that only candidates and political parties could
legally challenge the results. How was the plaintiff to present his case
in these circumstances?

(1961) 1 All NLR 277 (NFSC).
See T Abayomi ‘Continuities and changes in the development of civil liberties
litigation in Nigeria’ (1990-1991) 22 University of Toledo Law Review 1035.
49 (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt 611) 355 (NSC).
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Egolum claimed to have a right to contest the election in question.
Yet, from all available evidence he had no such right and his petition
was therefore doomed from the beginning to denial. He was not
sponsored by any political party. The Court of Appeal, sitting as the
first instance tribunal in this petition, dismissed it. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, it was held that Egolum had an obligation to specify
the nature of the right that entitled him to contest the election. To
hold otherwise, the Court continued, was to permit any person not
qualified under the provisions of the law to claim a right to contest
an election. This would open the door of litigation to those the Court
referred to as ‘meddlesome persons’, including non-citizens of Nigeria,
under-aged persons and individuals not belonging to or sponsored by
political parties.
It is obvious that Egolum’s situation merits sympathy. As a registered
voter and a person who voted in the election, he had every right to
question its outcome if the right to vote in Nigeria meant no more
than an empty promise. However, his options were limited by a law
that prevented him a priori from presenting such a question in court.
Clearly, it was for this reason that, rather than couch his claim from
the position of a voter entitled to prevent an election producing the
wrong outcome, he bizarrely claimed that he had a right to contest
the election and to be returned as the winner. Yet, exercising the
franchise engages an ends/means calculation. It has been argued that
voting is not an end in itself but merely a means to an end – the end
of implementing democracy.50 In Egolum’s case, he had exercised the
means (voting) but felt that that had not served the end (ensuring the
vote counted towards enhancing democracy). His claim in court was
therefore to vindicate the ‘end’ component of the equation.
The Supreme Court’s decision pointed to the reason that may have
informed the ban placed on voters challenging the results of elections
in Nigeria: that it would open the floodgates of litigation. This, however,
is not an attitude of the Nigerian legal system specific to electoral cases.
The same justification is often presented for discouraging all other kinds
of litigation through strict standing requirements that diminish rather
than broaden access to the courts for the aggrieved.51 However, as I
will go on to demonstrate later in this article, stopping persons with
legitimate grievances about the handling of elections from acting on
those grievances through the legal channel encourages impunity. It
promotes recourse to extra-judicial methods, including violence, to
address those grievances.

G Kateb ‘The moral distinctiveness of representative democracy’ (1981) Ethics 357.
See also Gardner (n 12 above) 897.
51 T Ogowewo ‘Wrecking the law: How article III of the Constitution of the United
States led to the discovery of a law of standing to sue in Nigeria’ (2000-2001) 26
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 527.
50
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In order to show how inappropriate the lack of legal protection
accorded the right to vote in Nigeria is, I draw comparisons with
other jurisdictions. In doing so, it becomes evident that the fear of
opening up the floodgates of litigation to ‘meddlesome persons’,
as anticipated by the Supreme Court in Egolum’s case above, is
speculative and unfounded. As stated earlier, the United States falls
in the category of countries without a constitutional right to vote. 52
This is a misleading categorisation because, even though the right
may have been mentioned ‘only in a backhanded way’53 in the US
Constitution, the right to vote in the US is accorded very robust
constitutional protection.54
In Harper v Virginia State Board of Elections,55 the claimant challenged
a Virginian law requiring the payment of a poll tax as a precondition
for voting. The question before the Supreme Court was whether this
particular law violated the equal protection clause of the American
Constitution. The Court answered the question in the affirmative
and held that, although the right to vote in state elections was not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution, it was implicit by reason of
the First Amendment to the US Constitution. The Court also decided
that, where fundamental rights and liberties (like the right to vote)
are asserted under the equal protection clause of the US Constitution,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be scrutinised
closely and carefully confined . Therefore, unlike in Nigeria, the right
to vote in the US is tied to equal protection which is a fundamental
constitutional entitlement in that context.
On the basis of this recognition of the fundamental character of the
voting right under the US Constitution, it is possible to present a legal

Kirshner (n 32 above) 32.
P Karlan ‘Ballots and bullets: The exceptional history of the right to vote’ (20022003) 71 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1345.
54 The United States Supreme Court has, however, held consistently that
art I(2) of the Constitution provides a legal basis for the right to vote in federal
elections. See United States v Classic (1941) 313 US 299 (‘The right of the people to
choose … is a right established and guaranteed by the Constitution and hence is
one secured by it to those citizens and inhabitants of the state entitled to exercise
the right.’) See also Harper v Virginia Board of Elections (1966) 383 US 663. On the
other hand, it has been suggested that the right to vote is only a ‘fundamental
interest’ developed along with other similar interests by the US Supreme Court of
the Earl Warren era. Apart from the right to vote, that Court also added others like
the rights to criminal appeals and interstate travel. See G Gunther Constitutional
law (1985) 588. However, whether seen as a right or interest, the same Court in
Reynolds v Sims (1964) 377 US 533 561 held that ‘[u]ndoubtedly the right of suffrage
is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right
to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other
basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens
to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinised.’ H Lardy ‘The American
Supreme Court and the right to vote: Early doctrine and developments’ (1992) 23
Cambrian Law Review 69.
55 (1966) 383 US 663.
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claim on the basis of vote dilution (the rendering of votes to count for
less by political gerrymandering) so long as the claimant can prove
not only intentional discrimination against an identifiable political
group, but also the actual discriminatory effect on that group.56 The
same is true of voting schemes that invidiously minimise or cancel
out the voting potential of racial or ethnic groups.57 While these
cases deal with electoral policies that target particular racial or ethnic
groups, it has been stated that ‘one of the vastly underappreciated
consequences of the Bush v Gore58 case is its recognition that the
Constitution protects the right to vote from being arbitrarily infringed,
for any reason at all, whether or not race is involved’.59 However, of
course this argument has no effect on the Nigerian practice of refusing
individual voters to legally challenge the outcome of elections.
As well, unlike in the US, most other countries, although recognising
the importance of the right to vote in any effective democracy,
seem to confuse the ‘means’ of actualising the right (voting) with its
‘end’ (implementing democracy). As a result, most cases arising for
consideration in those jurisdictions on the voting right turn only on
the denial or potential denial of the vote and not on the tampering
with the vote once it is cast. This is, however, not the case in Canada.
Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides
that every citizen has the right to vote in an election of members of
the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified
for membership therein.
In Figueroa v Canada,60 the Canadian Supreme Court evaluated
the ramifications of this provision and the nature of the protection
it accords the right to vote. The Court understood that the provision
was relatively narrow, granting citizens no more than the bare right
to vote and to run for office in the election of representatives of the
federal and provincial legislative assemblies. The Court’s analysis,
however, did not terminate with that finding. It held instead that, in
their analysis of Charter rights, Canadian courts must look beyond the
words of the section which the Court concluded intended more than
‘the bare right to place a ballot in a box’.61 According to the Court:

56
57

58
59
60
61

Davis v Bandemer (1986) 478 US 109.
City of Mobile v Bolden (1980) 446 US 55. The dilution which is alleged in such
cases has been defined as a claim ‘that the election structure when superimposed
upon racially-oriented politics produces a situation that deprives them of the
benefit of their numbers in the political process. They are thus deprived of the
value voting.’ See K Butler ‘Constitutional and statutory challenges to the election
structures. Dilution and the value of the right to vote’ (1981-1982) 42 Louisiana
Law Review 851.
(2000) 531 US 98.
R Pildes ‘The future of voting rights policy: From anti-discrimination to the right to
vote’ (2005-2006) 49 Howard Law Journal 741 759.
(2003) 227 DLR (4th) 1.
Figueroa (n 60 above) para 19.
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The purpose of section 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting power
per se, but the right to ‘effective representation’. Ours is a representative
democracy. Each citizen is entitled to be represented in government.
Representation comprehends the idea of having a voice in the deliberations
of government as well as the idea of the right to bring one’s grievances and
concerns to the attention of one’s government representative.

If, according to the Court’s interpretation, there is more to the right
to vote than merely placing a ballot in a box, it follows, as has been
argued elsewhere, that the right has ‘an intrinsic value independent of
the outcome of elections’.62 The quality of the right therefore depends
less on the extent to which a single ballot could actually influence the
outcome of an election, but more on that single voter’s belief that her
vote could make a meaningful difference. This belief is truncated if,
after casting the ballot, the voter for some legal reason cannot ask basic
questions about what became of it. In the American and Canadian
systems, the right of voters to keep track of the ballot has thus been
incorporated into the right to vote.
However, while the position of the right to vote in both the United
States and Canada represents its most vigorous expression, they
may not be effectively extrapolated to the Nigerian political system
without taking contextual factors into consideration. If that is the case,
Nigeria may benefit from the experiences of countries closer to home.
One such country is Ghana, now recognised generally as a thriving
democracy. Section 42 of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution is very clear
on its protection of the right to vote. It provides that ‘[e]very citizen of
Ghana of eighteen years of age or above and of sound mind has the
right to vote and is entitled to be registered as a voter for the purposes
of public elections and referenda’.
In Tehn Addy v Electoral Commissioner,63 the Ghanaian Supreme
Court had an opportunity to pronounce on the boundaries of the
right. That case challenged a voter registration policy requiring voters
to register only within a specified time period. Relying on section 42
above, the Court held unanimously that the Electoral Commission
could not refuse to register the plaintiff outside that specified time
period and ordered the Commission to register him. In its judgment,
the Court held that through the exercise of the right to vote, the citizen
is able not only to influence the outcome of the elections and therefore
the choice of a government, but it also places the citizen in a position
to help influence the course of social, economic and political affairs
thereafter.64 The Court also surmised that ‘whatever the philosophical
thought on the right to vote, article 42 of the Constitution … makes
the right to vote a constitutional right conferred on every Ghanaian

Kirshner (n 32 above) 17.
(1997) 1 GLR 47.
64 Tehn Addy (n 63 above) 50.
62
63
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citizen of eighteen years and above’.65 The Ghanaian Constitution, like
in all those systems where the right to vote flows from a constitutional
source, is clear enough to permit any voter who fears that her ballot is
being discounted to seek legal redress.
Drawing from my analyses, it is possible to split the legal protection
of the right to vote into two parts. The first deals with the right to be
entitled to vote which includes the right to be registered as a voter. This
could accommodate voter disaffection with constituency delimitation,
voting procedure, campaign finance and the behaviour of political
parties during their primaries and which may have an adverse effect on
voters. Collectively these are what I argue constitute the ‘prospective’
element of the right to vote. Nigeria accords protection to this element
of the right to vote. I have noted this already and also stated that part of
the struggle to properly conceptualise the right to vote in the country’s
electoral system is owing to the conflation of the right to register with
the right to vote. But, however much these constitutive elements of
the prospective component of the right to vote (whether taken alone
or in conjunction with others) are significant, they cannot replace
the right itself when fully conceptualised. Therefore, the difference
lies with the second part of the right which is to vote and have the
ballot counted. This part, to the extent that it concerns what happens
to the ballot after it had been cast, is to my mind the ‘retrospective’
component of the right to vote. One major means of securing this
element of the right is for the voter to be able to keep track of her vote
and be legally permitted to challenge any action or policy that dilutes,
tarnishes, debases or stultifies it. It is here, as I have stated already, that
the Nigerian system is wanting.
As well, for the right to vote to enjoy meaningful legal protection,
the mechanism to achieve this must couple both its prospective and
retrospective cores. This could be accomplished in several ways, but
most effectively through a constitutional recognition of the right to
vote as a fundamental political/human right enforceable through the
ordinary legal mechanisms of enforcing all other civil and political
rights.

6

Why protect the right to vote?

Nigeria faced major challenges in the past when it attempted to
organise elections that were free and fair, and that met international
best practices. Most of these previous elections were poorly organised.

65

Tehn Addy (n 63 above) 52-53.
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Violence, vote rigging and other malpractices marred them. There is
a way in which the poor legal protection of the right to vote in Nigeria
relates to and incentivises questionable electoral practices. I discuss
this below.
After the 2003 general elections in Nigeria, a coalition of Nigerian
civil society organisations that monitored the elections issued a report
with the instructive title ‘Do the votes count?’ It was the group’s own
way of expressing the dilemma of that year’s elections in which voters
were deceived by those intent only on practising and perpetuating
electoral fraud. But if the 2003 elections were bad, those of 2007 were
worse. Enthusiastic voters were in 2007 in most parts of the country
denied the opportunity of casting their ballots and making them
count.
The transgressions witnessed in those elections included stuffing
electoral boxes with pre-marked ballot papers; violently hijacking
voting materials; non-delivery of sensitive electoral documents like
sheets for entering the scores of candidates (the sheets were then
marked in secret locations outside authorised voting stations with
fictitious scores); and shootings by thugs and compromised security
personnel to scare voters away so they could carry out electoral fraud.
Those who perpetrated these events did so in the secure knowledge
that the voters had no effective mechanism of making them accountable
for their actions. This is because voters lack a remedy if prevented from
exercising their right to vote or of securing the integrity of the ballot
where it is actually cast. In this section, I relate this to the larger goal
of strengthening the electoral process and democracy in Nigeria. In
doing so, I highlight the likely implications of perpetuating the current
weak regime of ballot protection in the country.
The first obvious implication of not strengthening the legal
protection of the ballot in Nigeria is that electoral violence will
continue. Violence before, during and after elections in Nigeria is

66

B Rawlence & C Albin-Lackey ‘Briefing: Nigeria’s 2007 general elections: Democracy
in retreat’ (2007) 106 African Affairs 497; SJ Omotola ‘”Garrison” democracy in
Nigeria: The 2007 general elections and the prospects of democratic consolidation’
(2009) 47 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 195; OO Emmanuel ‘Nigeria’s
2007 general elections and the succession crisis: Implications for the nascent
democracy’ (2007) 6 Journal of African Elections 14; A Agbaje & S Adejumobi
‘Do votes count? The travails of electoral politics in Nigeria’ (2006) 31 Africa
Development 25; WA Fawole ‘Voting without choosing: Interrogating the crisis of
“electoral democracy” in Nigeria’ in TL Kasongo (ed) Liberal democracy and its
critics in Africa: Political dysfunction and the struggle for social progress (2005) 149;
A Banwo ‘Nigeria’s 2007 elections: A great danger for future elections in Africa’
in VO Okafor (ed) Nigeria’s stumbling democracy and its implications for Africa’s
democratic movement (2007) 134; N Orji ‘Responses to election outcomes: The
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a recurring problem. The resort to violence is often born out of
frustration with the normal channels of redressing electoral grievances,
especially with the dominant role of incumbency considerations in
the electoral process. Rarely are persons responsible for violence
and crime in the course of elections arrested and brought to justice.
This encourages the resort to self-help by those who feel cheated. It
may further be argued that the presence of criminal laws mandating
the prosecution of electoral offenders in Nigeria provides significant
protection for the right to vote. However, this may not necessarily
be the case, for two reasons. The first is that the enforcement of the
law is weak, as I stated above. As significantly, where those charged
with enforcement fail in that duty, the legal means to hold them
responsible do not exist. Therefore, while criminalising behaviour
that harms the vote may offer some form of protection, it cannot
stand as a substitute for legally empowering voters to protect their
votes.
In Nigeria this has since given rise to what in civil society circles is
known as ‘mandate protection’.68 Groups that work in this area describe
the mandate as involving the relationship between the people’s votes
and the outcomes of elections,69 while to protect it involves the
combination of mobilising and organising citizens to insist that election
stakeholders operate within the law, as well as monitoring, exposing
and challenging election fraud and abuse at every step of the electoral
process.70 When it is recognised that mandate protection became
necessary because voters lack better alternatives to make their votes
count, it also becomes clear how risky such protective activities are
to those involved, especially if they are required to ‘insist’, not within
legal boundaries, but by taking the law into their own hands.71
Not providing adequate legal protection for the right to vote
obviously also leads to weak political parties. The worst that can
happen in a democracy is for the impression to be given that people’s
votes do not count in the outcome of elections. The first implication
is that it will affect voter enthusiasm and, second, political parties
67
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E Onwudiwe & C Berwind-Dart ‘Breaking the cycle of electoral violence in
Nigeria’ (2010) 263 Special Report 1 http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR263Breaking_the_Cycle_of_Electoral_Violence_in_ Nigeria.pdf (accessed 12 May
2012); E Obadare ‘Democratic transition and political violence in Nigeria’ (1999)
24 Africa Development 199 (‘Politics and violence are like Siamese twins in Nigeria.
Political activity has always featured a notable degree of violence…’).
See BU Nwosu ‘Civil society and electoral mandate protection in South Eastern
Nigeria’ (2006) 9 The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 20.
Global Rights Election mandate protection toolkit 2006 http://www.globalrights.org/
site/ DocServer/Election_Mandate_Protection_Toolkit_2006.pdf?docID=11083
(accessed 12 May 2012).
Global Rights (n 69 above) 8.
A Okoli & S Okobi ‘Mandate protection: JDPC Mobilises 10 000’ This Day
http://www.thisdaylive.com/
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will have little incentive to invest in expanding their membership
base. Both consequences are currently at play in Nigeria. The 2011
elections may have shifted the paradigm a little but before then,
voters never really felt that they could make any real difference by
voting in elections given their past experiences. At the level of political
parties, this only compounded already-existing challenges. The rise of
the political ‘godfather’72 who had the financial leverage to determine
who won an election or lost it, led to consigning to an insignificant
position the voter who had no such resources. Thus, political parties
would rather invest in attracting political godfathers to their fold than
ordinary voters. This was evident with the Nigerian ruling party – the
PDP – which, as a prelude to the 2007 general elections, actually
deregistered some of its members who had fallen out with the party
hierarchy.73
As has been argued, there is an intimate connection between the
activities of godfathers in Nigerian politics and the subversion of the
electoral process or electoral fraud as well as poor governance of
political society.74 This is so as such fraud perpetrated by godfathers
or their go-betweens deny voters control of a ‘valuable political
resource; the giving or withholding of their votes’.75 Moreover,
because of the unusual leverage godfathers have across the political
spectrum, there is a tendency for them to act with impunity and thus
subvert the rule of law. As part of this strategy, they are often given
to using violent means to reach their goals. Even among the political
opposition the objective is always to counter force with violence. A
prominent opposition politician was reported to have told Human
Rights Watch that ‘[i]f anyone tries to attack me, my boys will unleash
terror’.76
Besides, the prominence accorded godfathers in party formations
means that voters often count for little in electoral calculations. As a
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consequence, politicians would rather invest in cultivating godfathers
and capturing political party structures (that is, the party bureaucracy
that plays prominent roles in choosing candidates to be on the ballot)
than earning the confidence of voters. Without a strong and alert
membership able to insist on due process and to hold the officials
to strict levels of accountability, political parties are weakened and
suffer an erosion of internal democratic practices. Their dictatorial
orientations not only discourage and demoralise their members; they
also threaten the foundations of democracy. Yet, voters could ignore
both the powers of godfathers and the arbitrariness of the party
bureaucracy if they were offered better protection of their votes. In that
case, whatever the machinations of the godfathers and party officials,
individual voters could take steps to safeguard their votes from theft,
debasement or dilution. Rather, the current legal framework prioritises
the rights of candidates (fronted by godfathers) and political parties
to question the outcome of elections while denying voters the same
right.
The above scenario can only lead to voter apathy. When voters –
the most important actors in any democracy – lose interest in, and
enthusiasm for, the electoral system, there is little doubt that it is in
serious danger. If voters think they are less important than godfathers
in the estimation of political parties and electoral candidates, they
will obviously begin to question and doubt their own efforts and
commitment. This scenario is compounded by voters’ experiences as
party members because, in choosing candidates to place on the ballot,
Nigerian parties generally ignore the preferences of their members.
Party primaries in Nigeria are therefore mere rituals because party
leaders can subvert the will of their members by reversing, often
without explanation, the outcome of nomination congresses.77
Consequently, at both ends of the electoral spectrum voters need to
have their position better secured as a foundation for a sustainable
electoral system.

7

Conclusion

In this article I analysed the right to vote in Nigeria and the need for
it to be protected more vigorously in order to consolidate Nigeria’s
fledgling democracy. For Nigeria’s electoral democracy to grow and
be stabilised, the ordinary voter must be given a prominent place in
the electoral system. The strength of the system rests on the popular
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participation of society. I reckon, therefore, that the level of prominence
given to ordinary voters is inversely proportional to the degree of legal
protection that the vote is accorded by the legal system.
My critique of the current system in Nigeria is based on three points.
The first is the tendency to confuse the right the vote with the right to
be registered as a voter. My conclusion is that they are not the same
thing. Secondly, without the protection of the right to vote, there is a
likelihood for a disconnect between the votes cast by voters and the
outcomes produced. Thirdly, even where voters are allowed access to
the polls, political interference renders that access meaningless unless
there is an understanding that the law will be on the side of voters to
challenge such interference.
Having the above in mind, it is recommended that the right to
vote in Nigeria be made a fundamental human right to be enforced
like all other rights under the Constitution. This will not only confer
appropriate constitutional legitimacy on the right, but also comply
with the practices of several other jurisdictions, even those in Africa. It
will further show Nigeria’s openness to international and comparative
best practices. In addition, the electoral law should be amended to
allow voters the legal right to challenge the outcomes of elections
where they do not represent their will as voters.
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